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Abstract—Correctly labelled datasets are commonly required. 
Three particular scenarios are highlighted, which showcase this 
need. One of these scenarios is when using supervised Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs). These systems need labelled datasets 
for their training process. Also, the real nature of analysed 
datasets must be known when evaluating the efficiency of IDSs 
detecting intrusions. The third scenario is the use of feature 
selection that works only if the processed datasets are labelled. In 
normal conditions, collecting labelled datasets from real 
communication networks is impossible. In a previous work we 
developed a novel approach to automatically generate labelled 
network traffic datasets using an unsupervised anomaly based 
IDS. The approach was empirically proven to be an efficient 
unsupervised labelling approach. It was evaluated using a single 
dataset. This paper extends our previous work by using a greater 
number of datasets, gathered from a real IEEE 802.11 network 
testbed. The datasets are comprised of different wireless-specific 
attacks. This paper also proposes a new and more precise method 
to calculate the boundary threshold, used in the labelling process. 
Keywords-Automatic Labelling; Network Traffic Labelling; 
Unsupervised Anomaly IDS; IEEE 802.11 Datasets 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The need for correctly labelled datasets is generally 
disregarded in the area of intrusion detection, as it is commonly 
assumed that real nature of the analysed information is known. 
As we previously described in [1], there are three specific 
scenarios in which the need for correctly labelled datasets 
becomes particularly evident. One of these scenarios is when 
using supervised Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). This type 
of IDS requires labelled datasets to learn the difference 
between normal or malicious information. IDSs are commonly 
classified as supervised and unsupervised detection systems 
[2]. Unsupervised IDSs learn the difference between normal or 
malicious information autonomously, whereas supervised IDSs 
require correctly labelled training datasets to learn the 
difference. Commonly, training datasets are completely 
labelled, containing both types of information. If the training 
datasets is unlabelled, supervised IDSs assume that only non-
malicious information is included. 
Another of these scenarios in which correctly labelled 
datasets is needed is when evaluating the efficiency of the IDSs 
detecting intrusions. IDSs could be evaluated using multiple 
parameters, such as the amount of resources (CPU, Memory, 
etc.) the system consumes, or the required time to conduct the 
detection. Nonetheless, the most important aspect to evaluate 
IDSs is the number of intrusions that the system correctly 
identifies. Traditionally, the Detection Rate (DR), False 
Positive Rate (FPr), and False Negative Rate (FNr) have been 
the parameters used to evaluate the efficiency of IDSs. These 
parameters provide quantifiable evidence of how effective the 
IDSs are at making correct detections. For an IDS to be 
evaluated in terms of DR, FPr, and FNr, the real nature of the 
analysed information must be known. 
A similar need for correctly labelled datasets arises when 
feature selection techniques are utilised. Feature selection is 
used to minimise the number of metrics in a given dataset and 
to optimise the selection process of the most relevant set of 
metrics [3]. These techniques play an important role in 
improving the efficiency of IDSs, producing more accurate 
results. The use of feature selection is currently inappropriate 
for unsupervised IDSs, especially if the IDSs perform their 
detection in real-time. The implementation of automatic feature 
selection techniques for unsupervised IDSs is still a great 
challenge in intrusion detection [4]. One of the reasons for this 
is because feature selection works only if the records in the 
datasets have been previously labelled [4]. Feature selection 
requires labelled datasets in order to be able to evaluate the 
relevance of each metric or combination of metrics. 
Unfortunately, collecting labelled datasets from physically 
deployed networks is highly complicated [5], and in many 
cases impossible. In normal conditions, real network traffic is 
not labelled. If researchers controlled the network conditions, 
or if the network traffic were artificially generated using 
network simulation software (e.g. OPNET [6]), the instances in 
the network dataset could be labelled. However, this control of 
the network environment is not always possible. Even in 
controlled networks, assuring that the training datasets are 
correctly labelled or completely free of malicious information 
is extremely hard [7]. Training datasets are currently generated 
by implementing a previous off-line forensic analysis. 
In our previous work [1] we proposed a novel approach to 
automatically generate labelled network traffic datasets using 
the unsupervised anomaly based IDS proposed in [8]. Although 
it was empirically proven to be an efficient unsupervised 
labelling approach, this approach was only evaluated using a 
single dataset. In this paper, our aim is to extend the empirical 
evaluation of the approach presented in [1], using a greater 
number of network traffic datasets, comprised of different 
wireless-specific attacks, gathered from a live operational IEEE 
802.11 network testbed. In addition, a new and more advanced 
method to calculate the boundary threshold than the one 
presented in [1] is proposed, including an adjustment factor. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, the most 
relevant related work is reviewed. In section III, the 
performance measures used to evaluate the efficiency of IDSs, 
the description of the different datasets, and the distribution of 
the different belief values are introduced. The description of 
the approach for automatically labelling datasets, and the 
labelling results are presented in section IV. Finally, future 
work and conclusions are given in section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The need for correctly labelled datasets has been 
acknowledged multiple times in the literature on IDSs. For 
instance, the authors of [10] highlight that one of the main 
requirements for IDS efficiency evaluation is to have access to 
network traffic data previously labelled as normal or malicious. 
They also highlight the complexity and time required to 
implement the labelling process. Another work that highlights 
the need for correctly labelled datasets is [11]. Similar to [10], 
the authors of this work [11] highlight the complexity and time 
required for labelling network traffic data. 
There is limited work in this area. One of the few recent 
papers that target the automatic generation of labelled network 
traffic datasets is presented in [5]. The authors propose using 
unsupervised anomaly based IDS to label packet datasets. 
Their approach is known as a self-training architecture. Similar 
to our methodology, this work assigns a particular label to each 
packet based on the beliefs generated by the Dempster-Shafer 
Theory of Evidence. Using these beliefs, the authors calculate a 
Reliability Index (RI), and label the packets according to this 
index. The outcome of the RI is a value in the range [-1, 1] that 
determines the reliability of the packet labelling. The closer the 
value to each of the range ends, the higher confidence that the 
assigned label is correct. The closer to 0, the higher the doubt 
that the assigned label is correct. 
In [5], the authors define a guard region or rejection range. 
The packets with an RI value that falls in the guard region are 
rejected. Instead of using a guard region, the methodology that 
we proposed in [1] defines only a single boundary threshold. 
One of the main difficulties in [5] is to identify the appropriate 
limit values for the guard region. On the other hand, one of the 
difficulties in our work is to identify the appropriate threshold 
value. One of the disadvantages of the approach in [5] is that 
the authors need to execute their algorithm multiple times, in 
order to find the appropriate guard region. An exhaustive 
search is required. Despite these multiple repetitions, it is not 
guaranteed that the selected guard region would be appropriate 
for future data. In our work, the boundary threshold is defined 
only once for the whole dataset. Therefore, our approach does 
not require an exhaustive search. 
III. ANALYSIS OF BELIEF DIFFERENCE 
A. IDS Performance Measures 
The efficiency of IDSs in making correct detections can be 
evaluated using four well-known parameters. These are True 
Positive (TP), which represents attack frames correctly 
classified as malicious; True Negative (TN), which represents 
non-malicious frames correctly classified as normal; False 
Positive (FP), which represents non-malicious frames 
misclassified as malicious; and False Negative (FN), which 
represents attack frames misclassified as normal. Using these 
parameters is fundamental to calculating the following 
performance measures: 
• Detection Rate (DR), which is the proportion of 
malicious frames correctly classified as malicious 
among all the malicious frames. DR(%) = TP/(FN+TP) 
• False Positive Rate (FPr), which is the proportion of 
non-malicious frames misclassified as malicious 
among all the frames. FPr(%) = FP/(TP+FP+TN+FN) 
• False Negative Rate (FNr), which is the proportion of 
malicious frames misclassified as normal among all the 
malicious frames. FNr(%) = FN/(FN+TP) 
• Overall Success Rate (OSR), which is the proportion 
of any frame correctly classified. 
OSR(%) = (TN+TP)/(TP+FP+TN+FN) 
B. IEEE 802.11 Network Datasets 
The six different network traffic datasets used in the 
experiments conducted as part of this work have been gathered 
from a real IEEE 802.11 network testbed. This testbed is 
similar to the one described in [8], comprising an Access Point 
(AP), a wireless client accessing various websites on the 
Internet, a monitoring node and an attacker using Airpwn [9]. 
These unprocessed datasets are composed of both malicious 
and non-malicious frames. One of the datasets contains only 
normal frames. Using a post-gathering forensic analysis, the 
real nature of the instances in the datasets has been identified. 
For each frame in the dataset, the unsupervised IDS 
provides three levels of belief [1]. These are belief in Normal, 
which indicates how strong the belief is in the hypothesis that 
the current analysed frame is non-malicious, belief in Attack, 
which indicates how strong the belief is in the hypothesis that 
the current analysed frame is malicious, and belief in 
Uncertainty, which indicates how doubtful the system is 
regarding whether the current analysed frame is malicious or 
non-malicious. In an optimal situation, the detection system 
should provide high belief in Normal and low belief in Attack 
when the analysed frame is non-malicious. Similarly, when the 
current analysed frame is not from the AP, the detection system 
should provide high belief in Attack and low belief in Normal. 
If the system were not consistent with these criteria, it would 
be reasonable to assume the result is not accurate. 
For each frame, the difference between the belief in Normal 
and Attack has been calculated. The average belief difference 
values for each dataset are plotted in Fig. 1, categorised by the 
outcome of the IDS (i.e. TP, TN, FP & FN). The bar charts 
show the correct detection is produced by strong beliefs in the 
appropriate hypothesis. The frequency histograms of the belief 
difference for each datasets, representing how the belief results 
are distributed are shown in Fig. 2. This is the actual difference 
between the belief in Normal and Attack. Fig. 2 also shows the 
boxplots that represent the distribution of the belief difference, 
using the detection result of the unsupervised anomaly based 
IDS as the discriminant criteria. This is whether the frames 
have been correctly classified or not. For each dataset, an in-
depth description of the detection results of the IDS and the 
belief difference is presented in the following section. 
1) Normal Traffic Dataset 
The first analysed dataset contains only non-malicious 
network traffic between the AP and the wireless client. In total, 
3551 network frames, or instances, compose this dataset. The 
unsupervised IDS correctly detects 99.97% of the normal 
traffic dataset. 3550 instances are correctly classified as 
normal. Only 1 instance, 0.03% of the dataset, is misclassified. 
The correct detection is produced by very strong beliefs in 
Normal. In the cases of TN, the average belief in Normal is 
93.25%, and the average belief in Attack is 6.59%. In the cases 
of FP, the average belief in Normal is 38.15%, and the average 
belief in Attack is 61.25%, Fig.1.a. Since this dataset does not 
contain malicious network data traffic, the unsupervised IDS 
did not generate any FN or TP alarm when analysing this data. 
2) Airpwn Attack Datasets 
Three datasets were generated using the Airpwn attack. In 
the Attack01 dataset, the attacker replaces the whole content of 
the website to a custom one. In the Attack02 dataset, the 
attacker only replaces the images in the website. Lastly, the 
Mix Attack dataset comprises traces of the two previous types 
of attack. The Airpwn attack has been previously explained in 
more detail in [8]. All these datasets contain both malicious and 
non-malicious network traffic instances. 
For the Attack01 dataset, the IDS correctly classifies 100% 
of the dataset, 1281 frames. The correct detection is produced 
by very strong beliefs in the appropriate hypothesis. In the 
cases of TN, the average belief in Normal and Attack are 
92.39% and 7.41%, respectively. In the cases of TP, the 
average belief in Normal is 7.46%, and the average belief in 
Attack is 92.32%, Fig.1.b. No FP or FN alarms were generated. 
For the Attack02 dataset, the unsupervised IDS correctly 
classifies 99.98% of the traffic instances. 14413 instances are 
correctly classified as normal. Only 3 instances, 0.02% of the 
dataset, are misclassified. In the cases of TP, the average belief 
in Normal and Attack are 7.13% and 92.64%, respectively. In 
the cases of TN, the average belief in Normal and Attack are 
90.2% and 9.57%, respectively. In the cases of FP, the average 
belief in Normal is 42.45%, and the average belief in Attack is 
57.05%, Fig.1.c. No FN alarm was generated. 
Finally, 99.99% of the traffic dataset is correctly classified, 
for the Mix Attack dataset. 12049 instances are correctly 
classified as normal. Only 1 instance, 0.01% of the dataset, is 
misclassified. In the cases of TP, the average belief in Normal 
and Attack are 6.38% and 93.41%, respectively. In the cases of 
TN, the average belief in Normal and Attack are 91.84% and 
7.92%, respectively. In the cases of FP, the average belief in 
Normal is 36.92%, and the average belief in Attack is 62.57%, 
Fig.1.d. No FN alarm was generated. 
3) Deauthentication Attack Datasets 
Using the deauthentication attack, two datasets were 
generated. Both experiments are implemented using the same 
attacking tool HostAP [12]. The only difference between both 
datasets is in the topology of the real IEEE 802.11 testbed in 
which the datasets were gathered. Although these testbeds are 
composed of the same number of devices as the one described 
in [8], for the DeauthLong dataset, the attacker is located 10m 
away from the wireless client, whereas, for the DeauthShort 
dataset, the attacker is located only 1.5m away from the 
wireless client. This change in the topology produces a small 
variation in some of the measured metrics. 
For the DeauthLong dataset, the IDS correctly classifies 
98.94% of the dataset, 187 frames. Only 2 instances, 1.06% of 
the dataset, are misclassified. In the cases of TP, the average 
belief in Normal and Attack are 29.85.39% and 69.63%, 
respectively. In the cases of TN, the average belief in Normal is 
86.71%, and the average belief in Attack is 12.99%. In the 
cases of FP, the average belief in Normal and Attack are 
35.96% and 63.37%, Fig.1.e. No FN alarms were generated. 
For the DeauthShort dataset, the unsupervised IDS 
correctly classifies 96.93% of the traffic instances. 158 
instances are correctly classified as normal. Only 5 instances, 
3.07% of the dataset, are misclassified. In the cases of TP, the 
average belief in Normal and Attack are 30.99% and 68.54%, 
respectively. In the cases of TN, the average belief in Normal 
and Attack are 82.02% and 17.6%, respectively. In the cases of 
FP, the average belief in Normal is 44.27%, and the average 
belief in Attack is 55%, Fig.1.f. No FN alarm was generated. 
C. Analysis of the Belief Difference Results 
Once the belief difference for all the datasets has been 
calculated, the mean (µ) and the standard deviation (σ) of the 
belief difference, containing both malicious and non-malicious 
frames, are also calculated. These values have been tabulated in 
Table I, along with the coefficient of Skewness and the 
Kurtosis values. As explained in Section IV, these two values, 
µ and σ, will be used in the automatic dataset labelling process. 
TABLE I.  BELIEFS DIFFERENCE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Dataset Mean (µ) SD (σ) Skewness Kurtosis 
Normal 0.866 0.094 -2.712 11.321 
Attack01 0.85 0.104 -2.202 6.589 
Attack02 0.809 0.116 -2.017 5.641 
Mix Attack 0.839 0.105 -2.25 7.664 
DeauthLong 0.617 0.228 -0.123 -1.328 
DeauthShort 0.522 0.233 0.165 -1.036 
 
As can be seen in all the boxplots in Fig. 2, there is a very 
clear distinction in the difference values between the correctly 
classified and the incorrectly classified instances. In order to 
statistically represent the difference between the correctly and 
incorrectly classified instances, Table II shows the µ and the σ 
values of the belief difference for all the datasets. There is an 
evident statistical disparity in the µ values between the 
correctly and incorrectly detected frames. Using this difference, 
if a threshold defining the boundary between the correct and 
incorrect classifications could be found, misclassified instances 
could be discarded from the automatically labelled dataset. 
TABLE II.  BELIEFS DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS – COMPARISON 
Dataset 
Correct Detection Incorrect Detection 
Mean (µ) SD (σ) Mean (µ) SD (σ) 
Normal 0.866 0.094 n/a n/a 
Attack01 0.85 0.104 n/a n/a 
Attack02 0.81 0.116 0.146 0.058 
Mix Attack 0.839 0.105 0.256 0 
DeauthLong 0.621 0.226 0.274 0.258 
DeauthShort 0.535 0.225 0.107 0.046 
       
        (a)                   (b) 
       
        (c)                   (d) 
        
        (e)                   (f) 
 
Fig. 1. Bar Charts of the Resulting Set of Metric Frequency: (a) Normal 
dataset; (b) Attack01 dataset; (c) Attack02 dataset; (d) Mix Attack dataset;   
(e) Deauthentication Long dataset; (f) Deauthentication Short dataset. 
IV. AUTOMATIC DATASET LABELLING RESULTS 
This section describes the approach that we propose to 
generate the automatically labelled network traffic datasets. 
This approach was initially introduced in our previous work 
[1]. The difference between the belief in Normal and the belief 
in Attack plays an important role in the correct labelling of the 
attacks. The system makes use of the statistical disparity in the 
average belief difference between the correctly and incorrectly 
detected frames, described in Section III, to generate these 
labelled datasets. We propose the definition of a boundary 
threshold that could separate the correctly and incorrectly 
classified instances. Therefore, the misclassified instances 
could be discarded from the automatically labelled dataset. 
The boundary threshold (γ) is defined by (1), based on the 
mean and the second standard deviation values. This threshold 
was previously used in [1]. The threshold described in this 
paper also includes an adjustment factor (δ) with a value within 
the range [0, 1]. This adjustment factor is an addition to the 
method that we previously proposed in [1]. The value of δ 
allows to fine tune the value of γ, and the integrity of the 
automatically labelled datasets. 
γ = µ – (2σ)×δ   (1) 
The instances with belief difference above γ would be 
included in the labelled dataset, whereas the instances with 
belief difference below this threshold would not be included. 
This approach guarantees that only the cases that evidence 
strong support to one of the hypotheses are considered correct, 
and are finally included in the labelled dataset. For instance, 
the boundary threshold for the Normal traffic dataset, using δ = 
1, would be γnormal = 0.8664 – (2 ×	 0.0942) × 1 = 0.678. Any 
instance where the difference between the belief in Normal and 
the belief in Attack is larger than 0.678 will be included in the 
labelled dataset. In contrast, any instance where the belief 
difference is smaller than 0.678 will be discarded. After 
applying (1) to the Νormal dataset, using δ = 1, 95.92% of the 
original Normal dataset was included in the labelled dataset. 
          
        (a)                   (b) 
   
        (c)                   (d) 
   
        (e)                   (f) 
Fig. 2. Histograms and Boxplots - Beliefs Difference of Original Dataset, 
using Correctly and Incorrectly Classified Instances: (a) Normal traffic 
dataset; (b) Attack01 dataset; (c) Attack02 dataset; (d) Mix Attack dataset;   
(e) Deauthentication Long dataset; (f) Deauthentication Short dataset. 
In total, 3406 instances compose the new Νormal dataset, 
and 100% of the resulting dataset is correctly labelled. All the 
incorrectly labelled instances have been discarded, along with 
146 of the correctly labelled instances. Similarly, none of the 
new labelled datasets resulting after applying (1) using δ = 1 to 
the Airpwn datasets contain any misclassified frame. For the 
Attack01, 1212 instances compose the new labelled dataset. 
This is 94.61% of the original dataset. For the Attack02 dataset, 
94.89% of the original dataset (i.e. 13677 instances) compose 
the new labelled dataset, and 100% of the frames are correctly 
labelled. For the Mix Attack dataset, 11481 instances, 95.28% 
of the original dataset compose the new dataset. 570 correctly 
labelled instances were discarded from the original dataset. 
In contrast, after applying (1) to the deauthentication attack 
datasets, using δ = 1, the resulting labelled datasets still contain 
misclassified frames. In the case of DeauthLong dataset, 1 non-
malicious frame erroneously labelled as malicious is included 
in the resulting dataset. In total, 99.47% of the frames are 
correctly labelled. In the case of DeauthShort dataset, 4 non-
malicious frames are included in the resulting dataset, 
erroneously labelled as malicious. In total, 97.5% of the frames 
are correctly labelled. These erroneously labelled instances 
would skew the training process of supervised IDSs, the 
evaluation of IDSs, or the process of feature selection. 
Since the automatic dataset labelling process was not 
completely accurate using δ = 1, a number of experiments have 
been conducted with a double purpose. First, to evaluate the 
quality of the automatic dataset labelling approach, modifying 
the value of δ, and second, to identify the higher value of δ that 
would produce completely correct labelling with all the 
evaluated network datasets. In these experiments, the value of δ 
has been gradually reduced from 1 to 0. The modification of 
this value produces a more restrictive γ value, and the resulting 
labelled datasets would contain a smaller proportion of the 
original datasets. However, the smaller the δ value, the higher 
the probability of including only correctly labelled instances. 
For each dataset and each value of δ, the value of γ, the 
proportion of original datasets included in the labelled datasets, 
the number of frames that compose the new datasets, and the 
rate of correctly labelled instances in the resulting datasets have 
been calculated. Table III shows the results for δ = [0.3, 0.4]. 
TABLE III.  BOUNDARY THRESHOLD VALUES (δ = [0.3, 0.4]) 
Dataset δ 
Boundary 
Threshold 
(γ) 
Satisfy 
Threshold 
(%) 
Number of 
Frames in 
Dataset 
Correctly 
Labelled 
(%) 
Normal 0.4 0.791 85.81 3047 100 0.3 0.81 82.09 2915 100 
Attack 
01 
0.4 0.767 88.68 1136 100 
0.3 0.788 85.95 1101 100 
Attack 
02 
0.4 0.716 84.52 12182 100 
0.3 0.74 81.2 11703 100 
Mix 
Attack 
0.4 0.755 84.99 10241 100 
0.3 0.776 80.84 9741 100 
Deauth 
Long 
0.4 0.435 60.32 113 99.47 
0.3 0.48 56.61 107 100 
Deauth 
Short 
0.4 0.335 87.73 143 100 
0.3 0.382 49.08 80 100 
 
All the resulting datasets are 100% correctly labelled when 
δ = 0.3 is used. This is the higher δ value that makes the system 
to correctly label all the frames in all of the evaluated datasets. 
However, as the value of δ decreases, the amount of data 
included in the labelled datasets also decreases. Using δ = 0.3, 
the resulting labelled DeauthLong dataset contains 56.61% of 
the original dataset, whereas the resulting labelled DeauthShort 
dataset contains only 49.08% of the original dataset. 
The subset of the original datasets discarded during the 
labelling process could be manually classified implementing an 
off-line forensic analysis, and added to the automatically 
labelled dataset if required to ensure a consistent dataset. The 
manual effort required to do this would be much reduced. 
These results highlight a series of inconveniences for the 
automatic labelling process. First, the selection of the δ value 
has been done empirically. For an efficient automatic dataset 
labelling process, the need for a method to autonomously 
implement the selection of δ should be addressed in future 
work. Second, there exist a disparity in the value of δ that 
produces entirely correct labelled datasets, between both 
deauthentication datasets and the rest of datasets. Whereas 
using δ = 1, 100% of the instances are correctly labelled for the 
Normal and Airpwn attack datasets, the two deauthentication 
attack datasets require δ = 0.3. One of the reasons for this 
disparity can be the size of the datasets. Whilst the first four 
datasets contain thousands of instances, both deauthentication 
datasets contain less than 200 instances. A higher number of 
instances would make the statistical characteristics of the 
datasets converge to a more concrete distribution making the 
automatic dataset labelling process more accurate. There is a 
clear direct correlation between δ and the number of instances. 
If the size of the analysed datasets is small, the value of δ 
needed to autonomously generate 100% correctly labelled 
datasets should be also small. This correlation between the size 
of the datasets and the value of δ could be used to propose 
method to autonomously select the adjustment factor value. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper extends the automatic generation of correctly 
labelled network traffic datasets that we proposed in [1]. This 
approach uses the outcome beliefs of an unsupervised IDS to 
label the instances in the datasets. Only the cases that evidence 
strong support to one of the hypotheses are considered correct. 
The evaluation of the automatic dataset labelling approach uses 
six different datasets, gathered from a real IEEE 802.11 
network. The method to calculate the threshold γ presented in 
this paper adds an adjustment factor δ, which allows to fine 
tune the value of γ, and to increase the integrity of the 
automatically labelled datasets. The value of δ has been 
empirically chosen. A new method to independently select this 
value should be proposed in future work to achieve efficient 
automatic dataset labelling. Because of the small size of both 
Deauth datasets, the higher δ value that correctly labels the 
instance of all the evaluated datasets is δ = 0.3. The size of the 
datasets could be used to propose an automatic method to 
select the adjustment factor value δ. 
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